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Benign Hegemony? Russia’s Grand Delusion
By PROFESSOR STEPHEN BLANK
Russia’s aspirations in Central Asia prevent it from acting as a benign hegemon who 
helps those states to make more liberal economic and political decisions. Since 
Russia’s ambitions are rooted in its own deformed political economy and politics they 
thus inhibit such processes in Central Asia; Moscow’s pursuit of hegemony there is a 
surrogate for, or at times a defense against, liberalizing reforms.
Moscow repeatedly sponsors closed economic and security blocs for Central Asia and 
explicitly invokes its superior market position as a means for doing so. Russia’s 1999 
official strategy for relations with the E.U. submitted by then Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin stated that,
! As a world power situated on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to 
! determine and implement its foreign and domestic policies, its status and 
! advantages of a Euro-Asian state and largest country of the CIS. 
! [Commonwealth of Independent States] The "development of partnership with 
! the E.U. should contribute to consolidating Russia’s role as the leading power in 
! shaping a new system of interstate political and economic relations in the CIS 
! area." Thus, Russia would "oppose any attempts to hamper economic integration 
! in the CIS [that may be made by the E.U.], including through ‘special relations’ 
! with individual CIS member states to the detriment of Russia’s interests." (1)
Russian specialists also have developed a plan to reestablish a common CIS energy 
space including and threatening the Baltic states, and, of late, the three South 
Caucasian Republics. (2) The policy of swapping the debts of CIS members’ firms for 
1
Russian equity in their energy and strategic sectors also emerged after 1999. Today this 
policy is implemented through the efforts of states and corporations, like Unified Energy 
Systems (UES), to advance their own and Russia’s strategic and economic policy. It is 
no accident that the chief of the UES, Anatoli Chubais, now advocates "liberal 
imperialism," while running on the electoral list of SPS, a supposedly liberal but non-
imperial party. The swaps of debts for equity aim at achieving an integrated electric grid, 
and integration of defense industries, national airlines, gas pipelines, etc. which then 
become transmission belts for reasserting Moscow’s economic leadership in the CIS. 
Since no major transaction occurs without state approval these swaps mask hegemony 
behind the rhetoric of regional integration and cooperation.
Leading Russian spokesmen admit openly that the energy policy’s purpose is primarily 
political. (3)
Moscow recently suggested to the E.U. that all Eurasia become a closed trading region 
thereby restricting the potential trade opportunities of other CIS members. (4) It also 
proposes making the ruble the CIS’ currency. As a precondition for accepting Baltic 
membership in the E.U., Russia demanded compensation from Brussels for the trade 
penalties Moscow claimed it would endure as a result of Baltic membership in the 
Union. The Kremlin evidently still seeks compensation from Brussels for losses that 
further E.U. expansion might entail for Russia. (5) Meanwhile virtually every East 
European government reports that Russian special services, embassies and energy 
companies collude with members of organized crime to obtain commanding positions in 
their economies and to buy compliant politicians. (6)
Moscow’s efforts to compel CIS regimes to ship oil and gas exclusively through Russian 
pipelines and to organize a CIS gas cartel under its leadership are well known. It 
already controls a large and growing amount of Kazakhstan’s future energy shipments 
and Gazprom is making deals with every CIS state to monopolize its gas distribution. 
Russia’s recent deal with Turkmenistan starkly reveals Moscow’s modus operandi, 
including the open participation of organized crime syndicates in these transactions. 
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Theoretically regional cooperation might maximize favorable returns for all CIS states; 
Moscow however, opposes cooperation except on its hegemonic terms, preferring 
exclusively bilateral ties with states that will support it behind a facade of multilateral 
cooperation which actually disguises its hegemonic objectives. Although this policy 
originated under President Boris Yel’tsin, Putin has honed it. This sharpening coincides 
with the visible improvement in Russian foreign policy’s overall consistency and 
cohesion. (7)
Neither will Putin support democratization abroad. He has clearly awarded a rising role 
to the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) to coerce and undermine CIS regimes, 
including support for criminal enterprises linked with the SVR’s activities on behalf of 
energy interests like Gazprom. (8
Moscow’s recent gas deal with Turkmenistan exemplifies Russia’s approach: A large 
quantity of Turkmen gas will be shipped through Russia to Ukraine by a little-known gas 
company, TransUral, whose major stockholder, Semyon Mogilevich, is one of Russia’s 
most notorious criminal kingpins. The Trans-Ural firm will earn from $320 million to $1 
billion from this deal alone. And all the firms involved, including Gazprom, already are 
contributing to Putin’s reelection.
Russian Policy Goals: Strategic and Economic
Russian analysts postulate five goals in Central Asia: (9)
• Promoting stability to prevent threats from the South;
• Fully developing regional transit capabilities to expand trade with China, India, and 
Iran;
• Preserving a unified Central Asian economic space;
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• Using the region’s geostrategic potential to promote Russia as an international and 
regional great power;
• Securing foreign governments’ recognition of Russia’s special role in Central Asia..
To achieve these objectives they recommend that Russia:
! • Use multilateral organizations like the Shanghai Cooperative Organization 
! (SCO) more effectively
! • Upgrade the equipment protecting the pre-1991 Soviet border;
! • Develop Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s hydro-electric potential;
! • Maximize Russia’s role in developing the Caspian Sea;
! • Protect ethnic Russians (and Russian speakers) in Central Asia;
! • Promote Russian cultural interests by supporting programs to teach Russian 
! and provide humanitarian aid to the region;
! • Work with local opposition governments.
Putin’s government appropriated much of this program, launching efforts to bring these 
states into a single defense and security organization under its exclusive auspices to 
exclude the West and particularly the U.S. What has been publicised recently of 
Russia’s new Security Doctrine includes many of these goals and adds the threat of 
preemptive military strikes to further their achievement.
However, this is not the whole story. As Russian energy policy in Northeast Asia reveals, 
energy policy is both highly competitive and contentious. Today the energy companies 
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and the Energy Ministry have become vehicles for Russia’s hegemonic "integrationist 
policies." Indeed, some legislators and officials insist that Russia should own up to 30% 
of CIS states’ energy companies, giving Russia decisive leverage over them. While this 
bureaucratic or factional struggle exemplifies continuing problems in Russia’s foreign 
policy coordination, it is quite unlike the chaotic policymaking that typified the Yel’tsin 
era. Meanwhile, energy policy aims at perpetuating the oligarchical illiberal capitalism of 
the 1990s and the closed political economic system that Putin is consolidating. Thus, 
Russia supports the authoritarian status quo in Ukraine and Central Asia and opposes 
anything that strengthens these states’ economic or military independence. 
Russian spokesmen openly regard Central Asian energy as a competitor which must be 
suppressed. The President of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky (in comments made before 
his recent confrontation with the Putin admististration), insists that Russia must "push 
aide" other producers by expanding its pipeline network through which to take their oil. 
Since Caspian oil is cheaper to produce, Russia cannot compete with it on world 
markets. Russian policy aims at restricting Central Asian production and infrastructure 
development lest Russian oil and gas companies be shown as less competitive given 
their high cost, wasteful monopolistic structure, and dilapidated infrastructure. (10)
Foreign sales of Central Asia’s abundant energy deposits could restrict Russia’s 
competitive profile in key markets, particularly India, Japan, China, and South Korea 
which are widely expected to surge through 2020 with vastly increased rates of demand 
for energy, thus creating a catastrophe for Russia’s economy. Hence the quest for a 
Moscow-led, OPEC-like gas cartel that limits Central Asia’s gas infrastructure only to 
outlets compatible with Russia’s.
Strategic and Domestic Factors in Russian Policy
Geopolitically Russia aims at unilaterally securing Central Asia against any American 
presence lest Central Asia’s westward energy orientation precede a similar defense 
orientation. Then, alliance with and bases for the United States and NATO will be 
5
deemed by Moscow to threaten Russia’s vital security, political, and commercial 
interests. As Yevgeni Verlin writes,
! a greater threat to the Russian establishment is that if the United States is 
! successful in democratizing the Middle East, this will lead to the democratic 
! restructuring of Central Asia and the whole of the southern periphery of the post-
! Soviet space. And this challenges Russia’s national interests. This is why it has 
! sought to hinder democratization and the creation of open economies, since 
! under such conditions it would not be competitive. (11)
Moscow sought to prevent Central Asian states from building corridors to the Indian 
Ocean (the Tedjen-Serakhs railway) and any transportation axis connecting 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan. Likewise it has aimed, with 
mixed success, to obstruct the E.U.’s new "silk road" or TRACECA and INOGATE 
projects, which plan trade and pipeline routes directly from Europe to Central Asia, 
bypassing Russia.
Moscow also obstructed Azerbaijan’s drive for energy and political independence, 
strongly opposing the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project with a proposed extension to 
Kazakhstan and possibly Turkmenistan which entailed building pipelines under or 
across the Caspian Sea that would give all those states options other than Russia and 
Iran. Likewise, Moscow helped facilitate the abortive coup in Turkmenistan in late 2002 
to sideline a planned gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to the Indian 
Ocean and Pakistan, and possibly India.
Moscow has few options since it cannot offer these states tangible alternatives to U.S. 
economic and strategic benefits, either for development or against terrorism. This has 
suggested a policy of attempted coercion without the necessary means either to coerce 
or to reward adherents.
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Since infrastructure issues are strategically vital, Russia’s Central Asian policies are 
also conceived strategically to overcome past economic failure throughout Russia’s 
energy producing regions including the Far East. Infrastructural issues unite Russian 
interests in Central and East Asia. Local and central leaders understand that Russia can 
overcome Siberian and Far Eastern afflictions only by robust cooperation with both 
Central Asia and East Asian states. Foreign observers also share this outlook. In 1998, 
the Kazakh political scientist Nurbulat Masanov wrote that,
! U.S. and Western trans-national corporations are active in the exploration of 
! Central Asian resources and are particularly interested in reducing Russia’s 
! influence in the region. When new transport routes, such as the Trans-Caucasus 
! corridor, become operational, Russia is expected to experience serious negative 
! consequences. The point is that the flow of export goods from Central Asia 
! across Russia, unites the Urals, the Volga region, Western Siberia, and the Far 
! East into a single complex. If this flow takes alternative routes it is quite possible 
! that the territorial integrity of Russia will be endangered. And with China playing a 
! larger role in the eastern part of Russia, this process is fraught with even greater 
! unpleasantness. (12) (Italics author)
Therefore competitive failure in East Asia seriously weakens Moscow domestically and 
in Central Asia. Thus, Russia tries strenuously to revive cross-regional trade between 
these areas. Moscow fully grasps the threat posed by its economic failures in these 
regions and by a resurgent China. For, if Russia cannot become "a worthy economic 
partner" for Asia and the Pacific rim, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Kudrin warned that, 
"China and the Southeast Asian countries will steamroll Siberia and the Far East." That 
would also happen in Central Asia. Consequently, Russian energy policy betrays a 
definite reserve, if not suspicion, towards giving China too much influence in Russia or 
Central Asia.
Not surprisingly Putin outlined in 2000 a comprehensive plan to connect Europe and 
Asia through projected transformation of Russia’s infrastructure. He stressed Russia’s 
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"natural" role as a bridge and hub linking Asia, Eurasia, and Europe through joint 
development of major projects that transcend energy, electricity, and power engineering, 
to include rail, sea, air, and space satellites and communications. Putin warned that 
failure to develop Russian Asia meant Chinese, Korean, or Japanese hegemony there. 
Moreover, this transportation network must be unified because "a single transportation 
backbone should span Russia if it wants to develop as a unified, strong, and 
independent state." He also announced that problems of the development of Siberia on 
the state agenda were, "key, pressing, [and] strategic ones." (13) But the importance of 
Moscow’s programs transcends their significance for Russia’s East Asian position to 
comprise part of the grander design to exploit its geographic location to tie together 
commerce with Europe, Central, South, and East Asia.
Ultimately these projects also connect with Russian ambitions for North-South corridors 
linking Russia, Iran, India and Central Asia. This grand design can materialize only with 
massive foreign investment and support to make Russia the hub of a vast network of 
Eurasian inland trade and transportation and materially stimulate the growth of inner 
and Russian Asia, greatly strengthening Moscow’s international political standing. 
Russian officials see its railroad net as a key link in future East-West transcontinental 
trade routes, claiming that deliveries through the projected North-South Corridor from 
Asia to Europe, which would intersect with the East-West routes would take 20 days, as 
opposed to shipments through the Suez Canal that take 45 days. Allegedly the cost per 
container will fall by $400-500, giving Moscow hundreds of millions of dollars from 
transit charges, taxes, and customs revenues while also effectively competing with the 
Suez Canal and the EU’s TRACECA and Silk Road projects that bypass Russia. One 
assessment of this projected corridor claimed in 2000 that it would tie together Finland, 
the Baltics, Russia, several Gulf states, and India.
But while the vision is grandiose, policymakers must confront the real problems that 
hinder completion of this project and realization of the other partners’ interests: cash 
shortages, deficient policymaking structures and lack of infrastructure.
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Equally, if not more, consequential are the motives stemming from considerations 
relating to Russia’s domestic political economy. Gazprom and the government’s recent 
deal with Turkmenistan exemplifies this fact. Russia’s efforts to restrict and control 
Turkmenistan’s gas exports and obstruct competition with Gazprom are long-standing. 
Meanwhile Gazprom overtly and successfully refused to reform itself, undoubtedly 
exploiting and justifying its utility as an instrument of state policy. To evade reform while 
serving the state’s interests it has made deals to monopolize gas distribution and 
pipelines for virtually every CIS member. Thus it exploits and seeks to perpetuate 
Central Asian regimes’ dependence on Russian pipelines. Moreover, it continues the 
post-1998 pattern of Russian industry to maintain its predatory position in the Russian 
economy by continuous redistribution of former Soviet property outside Russia, a 
system that depends on nonmarket state interventions on behalf of Russian 
corporations.
The Turkmenistan deal reflects both these issues and the larger linkages of Russian 
domestic and foreign policy. After facilitating an abortive coup in November 2002 to 
impede Turkmenistan’s energy independence by means of exports through Pakistan to 
the Indian Ocean, Moscow displayed its power to Turkmenistan and successfully gained 
the right to sell Turkmen gas, which now lacked other pipeline options, at concessionary  
terms in return for the strengthening of Sapirmurad Niyazov’s dictatorship. (14) While 
Turkmenistan thus sold its gas at concessionary terms to Russia through Gazprom and 
Trans-Ural, Gazprom then sold it back to other Central Asian states.
This procedure offers Gazprom and Russia multiple advantages. Russia can buy 
Turkmen gas at half price giving it 100% profit before expenses. Gazprom also can 
continue to sell gas in the Russian domestic market for $21.50 per cubic meter, giving 
Russian industry a subsidy of about $60 per cubic meter of gas consumed. Since 
domestic oil costs $6-8 a barrel, Russia is using its energy reserves not to develop 
industry, but to subsidize its obsolescent industries. The Turkmen deal further allows 
Gazprom to delay multi-million dollar investments in northern Russian gas fields while 
cost gas. Turkmen gas thus ensures subsidization of cheap Russian gas to Central 
9
Asian states, which cannot pay full cost in cash, so Ashkabad loses billions in revenues 
as well. Moscow, not Western firms or Turkmenistan, now controls the marketing and 
transport of Turkmenistan’s gas abroad. This, and subsequent arrangements with other 
CIS governments, mark a giant step towards Putin’s vision of a Russian-dominated gas 
cartel.15
Thus Russia’s domestic pathologies drive policy to maintain anti-liberal and anti-
democratic regimes and policies in Central Asia and the CIS and to insinuate organized 
crime into energy policy. These sinister policies cannot but cause alarm about Russia 
and the future of the CIS, especially in light of Russian analysts’ claims that, at the 
recent G-8 meetings in Evian, "Russia received responsibility for the post-Soviet space." 
Moscow now supposedly is responsible for ensuring no CIS government becomes a 
failed state. Sadly, if the Russian claim is true, the G-8 made the wrong move. Russia’s 
current policies cannot but lead to failed, anti-liberal, and backward states throughout 
the CIS. While this may be hegemony, it is hardly benign. 
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